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School-based management (SBM) has emerged as an 
important instrument of education policy in Latin 
America over the last few decades. Since we are almost 
all advocates of participatory approaches to develop-
ment in theory, one might think we should embrace 
SBM and decentralized educational programs more 
broadly as a method for improving school administra-
tion and student achievement in Latin America. In 
theory, SBM would mean that parents have a greater 
voice in school decision making, more direct control 
over policy decisions, and more direct access to policy 
decision makers (World Bank, 1999). In theory, this 
would mean that school programs, policies, and cur-
ricula could be tailored to local needs and specificities, 
with parents holding decision makers more account-
able (Burki, Perry, & Dillinger, 1999; Mohrman & 
Wohlstetter, 1994).  
However, an equally compelling case can be made 
that these reforms will disappoint their architects and 
intended beneficiaries. Specifically, in contrast to the 
SBM premise that participatory institutions can ad-
vance democratic values even in the case of social and 
material inequality, an alternative socioeconomic status 
(SES) model holds that social and material equality 
may be a necessary condition for fair, equal, and effec-
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tive democratic deliberation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 
1980; Verba & Nie, 1972; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 
1969). More succinctly, the SES model posits income, 
education, and residential location—whether analyzed 
alone or in some combination,—as strong predictors 
of one’s level of participation in democratic institutions 
(Conway, 1991; Nagel, 1987; Verba & Nie, 1972).  
In view of the recent policy shift towards decen-
tralized education in Latin America, exploration of the 
influence of socioeconomic status on one’s propensity 
to participate in decentralization educational programs 
is required. This information can help us understand 
how the benefits of decentralized educational pro-
grams are distributed across households and commu-
nities. This information can also sharpen the criticism 
against decentralization on equity issues and contrib-
ute to the ongoing debate surrounding empowered 
participation and decentralized education in the de-
veloping world. 
Purpose of the Study 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and parental participation in 
newly decentralized educational programs. We focus 
our attention on Nicaragua’s New Law of Education 
Participation, which asks parents to contribute their 
resources by participating in local school councils. An 
SES hypothesis predicts that socioeconomic differences 
among individuals, if they exist but are unaccounted 
for in the program design, would influence levels of 
parental participation in autonomous school councils 
so as to privilege wealthier or better educated 
individuals while marginalizing less wealthy or less 
educated individuals in school deliberations (Agrawal 
& Gupta, 2005; Hirschman, 1970). In the aggregate, 
an SES hypothesis might also imply that 
socioeconomic differences at the community level 
might generate sufficient levels of parental 
participation in school communities with wealthier, 
more educated, or generally better-off populations 
while failing to generate sufficient levels of 
participation in school communities defined by 
poverty, illiteracy, or marginalization (Bardhan, 2002). 
If the program benefits of decentralized decision 
making are thought to flow directly from increased 
parental participation, one could presume that a 
participatory deficit would offset the assumed gains of 
the reform (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005).  
The specific research question of the paper is: 
Does a primary caregiver’s socioeconomic background 
predict her/his participation in autonomous school 
councils? To address this question, the study examines 
self-reports from parents and other primary caregivers 
from five schools in the Nicaraguan municipality of 
Matagalpa. Statistical procedures provide measures for 
the independent variables (income, education, and 
crime). The rationale for selecting these variables is 
discussed below. Descriptive statistics measure the de-
pendent variables (levels of parental participation in 
school councils). To test the hypothesis that socioeco-
nomic conditions influence one’s propensity to par-
ticipate in school councils, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) examines school differences in both the in-
dependent and dependent variables. Next, discrimi-
nant functions analysis examines the relationship be-
tween independent and dependent variables within 
each school. Next, the same relationship within the 
general respondent population is examined, without 
controlling for schools. Finally, discriminant functions 
analysis considers the relative contributions of ‘school’ 
as an overarching variable predicting participation. 
Background 
Following the return of democracy to Nicaragua in 
1990, the newly elected conservative government of 
Violetta Chamorro embarked on an ambitious project 
to reform primary and secondary schools in Nicara-
gua. The project, known as the Autonomous Schools 
Program (ASP), was exemplary of a prevailing neolib-
eral logic that argued that parents should be provided 
with an opportunity to influence school decisions 
through their votes and participation in local school 
councils (Gershberg, 2004). Under such an arrange-
ment, it was argued, a better set of interests and in-
formation would be considered in school planning 
because parents are best positioned to diagnose prob-
lems and find pedagogic solutions to a school’s specific 
learning and administrative problems (Burki, Perry, & 
Dillinger, 1999). The ASP was also promoted as a 
means of depoliticizing education in Nicaragua be-
cause it took the power to hire school principals from 
the minister of education, a political appointee, and 
placed it directly in the hands of parents (Arcia & 
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Belli, 1999). As of 1993, a number of primary and 
secondary schools entered the autonomy program on a 
voluntary basis, with many more to follow over the 
next nine years. These new autonomous schools 
formed local school councils that were charged with 
decision-making authority over budget, personnel, and 
planning functions. The councils also had the author-
ity to determine the level of fees charged to parents for 
attendance and/or examinations. The school council 
became the primary decision-making unit and con-
sisted of elected representatives from the local com-
munity with parents having a strong voting majority 
(Gershberg, 2004; Arcia & Belli, 1999).  
In March 2002, the voluntary ASP was scaled up 
to cover all public schools through ratification of the 
New Law of Education Participation. The New Law 
effectively meant that all public schools in the country 
would be converted into autonomous schools by 
2006, regardless of their willingness or managerial ca-
pacity to do so. While a number of government agen-
cies, organizations, and independent researchers have 
evaluated the ASP, (see: Gershberg, 2004, 1999; Minis-
try of Education Nicaragua, 2004; Gunnarsson et al, 
2004; Asensio, Ruiz and Sequeira, 2001; King, Ozler 
and Rawlings, 1999; Gershberg and Jacobs, 1998; 
Fuller and Rivarola, 1998) this knowledge is limited 
because it is informed by the study of schools that vol-
unteered for the program or were handpicked by the 
ministry; in other words, schools that tended to be 
high-performing (Gunnarsson, 2004). This study pro-
vides a first look at how weaker schools (those neither 
handpicked nor willing to exert effort to become 
autonomous) are adapting to the demands of educa-
tion decentralization in Nicaragua. This new informa-
tion is important to ensure that the relative merits of 
the program are understood on the basis of a represen-
tative case sample. Results can also shed important 
light on whether we ought to adopt deliberative or 
participatory prescriptions without first equalizing the 
resources that stakeholders can deploy.  
Aside from mandating autonomy for all public 
schools, there are several notable differences between 
the New Law and the ASP. First, the New Law clearly 
specifies the operational procedures for the school 
councils, which were lacking under the ASP. According 
to the New Law, parent representatives are to be 
elected by secret voting, with a quorum of 60 percent 
of parents. The elected representatives then form a 
parent council (consejo de padres). Similar associa-
tions are formed by elections among teachers (consejo 
docentes) and students (gobierno estudiantil). The 
elected parent, teacher, and student representatives 
and the school principal form the local school council 
(consejo directivo), with a voting majority of parent 
representatives. School councils have a range of pow-
ers, including the power to hire, fire, reprimand, and 
evaluate principals and teachers. They also have a 
range of decision-making power over administrative 
and planning functions and limited discretion over 
budget allocation. A second feature of the New Law is 
that it calls for community elections for the position of 
school principal. A third feature of the New Law is that 
it clearly states that school fees are to be voluntary, 
clarifying much of the confusion surrounding school 
fees under the ASP.  
I examine the implementation and practice of the 
New Law in five schools from the municipality of 
Matagalpa. Located in the central highlands, it is the 
primary coffee-growing region of the country and a 
principle conflict zone of the civil war. Poverty, illiter-
acy, and crime characterize life in much of Matagalpa, 
particularly in the hillsides that surround the city. 
Matagalpa was selected as the investigation site be-
cause of this profile. Individual schools were selected 
for variation in SES characteristics. The names of 
schools have been changed to protect identities, but a 
description of each school is presented as accurately as 
possible.  
I have given the five schools in this study the ali-
ases “Santa Ana,” “El Tuma,” “La Dalia,” “San Ramon,” 
and “La Garita.” All five schools fall within the juris-
diction of Matagalpa, but they differ in several re-
spects. The first school, Santa Ana, displays conditions 
considered to be the most conducive for school auton-
omy within the sample. Santa Ana is located closest to 
the city’s core. The data, discussed below, shows that 
Santa Ana is a relatively safe community and parents 
have, on average, a higher level of formal schooling 
than their counterparts in the sample. El Tuma shares 
many of the contextual characteristics that define Santa 
Ana. On average, parents have a higher level of formal 
education, more sufficient household incomes, and a 
comparatively better level of community security. This 
similarity is not surprising given that Santa Ana and El 
Tuma are located less than 10 blocks from one an-
other. La Dalia is located on a hill overlooking the 
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southern part of the city and is located about 25 
blocks from the city’s downtown core. Parents in this 
area have lower levels of formal schooling and lower 
household incomes than parents in the Santa Ana and 
El Tuma communities. San Ramon and La Garita are 
the most peripheral, located more than 15 kilometers 
from the city’s downtown core. Both schools are lo-
cated in the northern hills that surround the city of 
Matagalpa. In terms of the SES characteristics being 
considered in this study, La Garita stands as the most 
disadvantaged of the five sample schools. It is situated 
in a small mountain barrio on the outskirts of town 
and is the smallest school in the sample in terms of 
student enrollment. Crime is rampant in this commu-
nity and parents generally rank the level of security in 
their community as “very poor or lacking.” Compara-
tively, parents in this community also have the lowest 
average level of formal schooling. 
Theory: The SES Framework 
Previous research on political participation is charac-
terized by the debate between three competing schools 
of thought; namely, the socio-structural school status 
(Conway, 1991; Nagel, 1987; Verba & Nie, 1972), the 
political culture school (Putnam, 1995; Putnam et al. 
1993; Dutch, 1993; Almond & Verba, 1963), and the 
institutional school (North, 1990; Downs, 1957; Ar-
row, 1951). Each school of thought takes a different set 
of variables to be the main determinants of political 
participation. However, much of this research agrees 
that to explain participation it is important to consider 
economic and social factors at the household and 
community levels.   
Some of the earliest work on political participation 
suggests that household income level has a significant 
effect on one’s propensity to participate in democratic 
deliberation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1981; Acock & 
Scott, 1980). One possible explanation for this is that 
low-income persons suffer from greater stress in gen-
eral than people of higher SES do. Low-income indi-
viduals are more likely to experience personal prob-
lems, such as unemployment, and Dawson, Prewitt, 
and Dawson (1977) find that one’s preoccupation with 
personal problems leads to a decline in political par-
ticipation. This finding is also supported, in part, by 
Milgram’s (1970) concept of overload, which refers to 
an individual’s inability to process inputs from the en-
vironment because there are too many inputs or inputs 
come too fast. When overload is present, the individ-
ual adapts by selectively attending to inputs and even 
ignoring some inputs altogether. In a highly stressful 
environment, political participation may decrease as 
other, more immediate demands for the individual’s 
time and resources increase.     
One’s level of formal education has been shown as 
an important variable explaining  propensity to par-
ticipate in democratic deliberation. For example, 
Brady, Verba, and Scholzman (1995) show that indi-
viduals might not participate in politics because they 
lack the civic skills and vocabulary for involvement. 
On this account, formal education may confer upon 
individuals the skills and resources required for par-
ticipating democratic deliberation. Simply stated, edu-
cated individuals are more likely to possess the cogni-
tive and literacy skills required to absorb and process 
complex information required for democratic partici-
pation. Additionally, illiteracy may be an impediment 
to satisfying informational requirements for participa-
tion (Bardhan, 2003). This may mean that underedu-
cated individuals want to participate, but lack the ba-
sic the skills for processing information even when it is 
made available to them (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 
2000). 
Levels of community violence and crime may also 
be an important part of the explanation for why people 
participate in democratic deliberations and civic asso-
ciations. This relationship may be explained, in part, 
by social capital arguments. For example, Hirschi’s 
theory of antisocial behavior (1969) proposes that 
humans are equally predisposed to commit crime and 
that it is our social ties to others that inhibit antisocial 
behavior. In other words, social bonds serve as a deter-
rent to criminal behavior (Savage & Kanazawa, 2002). 
Likewise, in terms of political participation, a number 
of researchers have also found that communities with 
strong social bonds also show relatively higher levels 
of political participation (Putnam et al, 1995; Putnam, 
1993; Verba & Nie, 1972; Almond & Verba, 1965). 
Community violence and crime rates may then be in-
dicative of social bonds and social capital that are 
found to be predictors of political participation. 
In terms of education research, several scholars 
have examined the relationship between social class 
and parental engagement in schooling. In her study of 
American elementary schools, Annette Lareau argues 
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that social class, independent of a child’s ability, exhib-
its a significant affect on children’s lives in schools 
(2000). More specifically, Lareau demonstrates how 
social class influences levels of parental involvement in 
schooling and shapes the resources parents have at 
their disposal to comply with school requests for assis-
tance. In a comprehensive analysis of America’s system 
of public education, Richard Rothstein (2004) demon-
strates the complex and ranging influence of social 
class on a child’s academic performance. On the basis 
of this analysis, Rothstein argues that school improve-
ments plans must be accompanied by broader reforms 
that mean to narrow the social and economic inequali-
ties that produce gaps in student achievement.      
Many studies of policy decentralization support 
these general arguments. For example, a number of 
case studies of decentralization initiatives have argued 
that the extent of local capture of the newly decentral-
ized program by local elites depends, in part, on levels 
of social and economic inequality and traditions of 
political participation within the community (Conning 
& Kevance, 2001; Crook & Manor, 1998). Agrawal & 
Gupta’s (2005) study of Common Pool Resources in 
Nepal finds that the likelihood of participation in 
newly formed community-level user groups is greater 
for those who are economically and socially better off. 
Several studies of accountability reforms in education 
find that decentralization initiatives cannot realize 
their objectives unless targeted schools have, or ac-
quire, the local capacity to meet the functional re-
quirements and demands of the program (Malen & 
Rice, 2004; Fullan, 2001; Hess, 1999). In the context 
of Nicaragua’s Autonomous Schools Program, Fuller 
and Rivarola (1998) find that, absent such local capac-
ity building policies, school communities have greater 
difficulty negotiating and implementing clear and col-
lectively held meanings of autonomy. Taken together, 
these studies support the position that SES indicators 
are likely to exhibit an important effect on one’s pro-
pensity for participation in newly devolved participa-
tory schooling programs (Nagel, 1987).  
Research Methodology 
The field research for this paper is part of a larger 
study designed to examine the form and practice of 
school autonomy in Matagalpa. The results and dis-
cussion presented here pertain to survey data collected 
for this larger project. The researcher spent 4 weeks in 
Matagalpa administering a 3-page survey consisting of 
63 close-ended questions. Before administering the 
survey, the researcher conducted a pilot study survey-
ing 1 principal, 18 teachers, and 22 parents from a 
trial school. Upon completing the trial survey, respon-
dents were asked to comment on their comprehension 
of the survey. Using this information, the survey was 
modified and language translation issues were resolved 
with the assistance of local translators.  
Having completed the pilot study, the researcher 
administered the final survey to 221 self-identified 
primary caregivers. To ensure that all caregivers could 
participate regardless of their literacy levels, the re-
searcher read the survey to all participants. Partici-
pants were informed that their responses were com-
pletely confidential. It is assumed that respondents 
were open and honest when reporting, an assumption 
that can be seen as a limitation of the study. However, 
research has demonstrated that when respondents are 
assured of confidentiality, self-report measures have 
good validity (Singer, Von Thurn, & Miller, 1995). 
Eighteen surveys were discarded or discontinued for 
various reasons, including: the respondent did not 
wish to continue the survey; the respondent repeatedly 
provided multiple answers to the same question; or 
the researcher felt that the participant was uncoopera-
tive. The participants in the present study are 204 self-
identified primary caregivers of primary and secondary 
students enrolled in one of the five schools. The par-
ticipants include 151 mothers, 33 fathers, 8 grand-
mothers, 7 aunts, 2 uncles, and 3 other individuals 
who did not fall into these categories but self-
identified as the student’s primary caregiver. The gen-
eral sample population is divided into five correspond-
ing school groupings, where Santa Ana consists of 73 
respondents, El Tuma consists of 26 respondents, La 
Dalia consists of 28 respondents, San Ramon consists 
of 37 respondents, and La Garita consists of 40 re-
spondents.    
Survey questions revolve around variables found 
to be significant predictors of participation in previous 
research. In total, I included 11 variables. Variables, 
number of questions, scale, and example questions are 
illustrated in Table 1 (page 7). Our independent vari-
ables include the school, household income, parental 
level of education, and community crime rates. The 
first item, the school variable, is a nominal measure 
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used to indicate the school in which the respondent’s 
child is enrolled (1= Santa Ana; 2= El Tuma; 3= La Da-
lia; 4= San Ramon; and 5= La Garita). “Income” is an 
ordinal measure used to assess the sufficiency of the 
respondent’s household income levels using a 6-point 
scale (1=excellent to 6=very pessimistic). “Education” 
assessed the highest level of formal education the re-
spondent achieved, using a 4-point scale (1= postsec-
ondary to 4=less than primary). “Security” assessed 
how respondents viewed the level of security or level 
of violence in their own community, using a 5-point 
scale (1=excellent to 5= very pessimistic). 
The dependent variables are presented in Table 1. 
The following questions were presented using a 2-
point scale (1=yes and 2=no). Parent Council Member-
ship assessed if the respondent had ever been a mem-
ber of the parent council. Parent Council Candidacy 
assessed if the respondent had ever been a candidate 
in an election for the parent council. Parent Council 
Elections assessed if the respondent had ever voted in 
an election for the parent council. Parent Council Par-
ticipation assessed if the respondent had ever partici-
pated in a meeting a general meeting of the parent 
council. School Council Attendance assessed whether 
the respondent had ever attended a meeting of the 
general school council. Parent Council Knowledge was 
used to assess whether the respondent can identify 
current members of the parent council. In terms of 
interaction, the variable Parent Council Utilization as-
sessed whether the respondent had ever spoken to a 
council member about education matters at the school. 
Findings and Discussion 
Observations of Independent Variables: 
Socioeconomic Status 
Table 2 (page 8) reports means and standard devia-
tions for the socioeconomic variables for the five 
schools. ANOVA reveals the schools are found to be 
statistically different in terms of education and highly 
statistically different in terms of community secu-
rity/violence. A statistically significant between-group 
difference for income was not found (F (2.202) = 
1.314, p= .266). The education variable is significant 
(F (2, 202) = 10.588, p<0.001), reflecting a moderate 
difference between schools in terms of caregiver edu-
cation levels. Post hoc analysis tests were conducted to 
examine which group means differ and how many 
group means differ.  Tukey’s B post hoc analysis reveals 
El Tuma, Santa Ana, and La Dalia as a homogenous 
subset group, to be distinguished from San Ramon and 
La Garita in terms of levels of caregiver education, 
where respondents in the first group report statistically 
higher levels of education than respondents in the sec-
ond group. In terms of security, a statistically signifi-
cant between-group difference was found for the secu-
rity variable (F (202, 2) = 30.146, p= < 0.001). Tukey’s 
B post hoc analysis reveal three homogenous sub-
groups where Santa Ana form one subgroup of care-
givers; El Tuma, La Dalia, and San Ramon form the 
second subgroup; and La Garita is distinguished as a 
third homogenous subgroup with the lowest ranked 
level of security in the sample.  
The moderate statistical significance of the educa-
tion variable and the high statistical significance of the 
security variable confirm that these school communi-
ties are differentiated by socioeconomic conditions 
pertaining to education and community security. The 
most striking aspect of these differences relates to the 
security variable, where the mean score for La Garita 
indicates that the vast majority of respondents are 
“very pessimistic” about the level of crime in their 
community. The researcher’s experience in this com-
munity supports this finding. Specifically, several 
young men accosted this researcher outside the school 
following one day-visit. Additionally, taxis often refuse 
to enter the community during the evenings and most 
residents of Matagalpa warn visitors against traveling 
into the community at any time of the day.  
Another interesting result relates to the income 
variable. The absence of statistically significant differ-
ence for the income variable indicates that household 
wealth is not part of the socioeconomic distinction of 
sample schools. However, mean scores for most 
schools fall within the range of average-to-deficient, La 
Garita being the exception with a mean score falling 
within the range of deficient-to-pessimistic.  
Overall, the sample schools exhibit features char-
acteristic of underdevelopment. First, participants in 
all five schools report levels of household income that 
are, on average, below the level of sufficiency. Second, 
participants in some schools—namely, La Garita and 
San Ramon—self-report levels of education that are, 
on average, only slightly better than a primary level. 
Third, these school communities are sharply distin-
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guished by levels of community violence and crime. 
Finally, the results reveal a trend whereby the poorer 
schools are also those with lower levels of adult educa-
tion, higher rates of crime, and a greater distance from 
the city center. 
 
Table 1: Description of Measures 
 
Measure Items Scale Example of Questions 
School Measures 
School 1 5 point (1= school no. 1 to 
5= school no. 5) 
What school does your child/ do your chil-
dren attend? 
Socioeconomic Measures (Independent Variables) 
Income 1 6 point (1= excellent to 6= 
very pessimistic) 
Is your household income sufficient to meet 
your needs? 
Education 1 4 point (1= post-secondary 
to 4= less than primary) 
How many levels of formal education have 
you completed?  
Security 1 5 point (1= excellent to 5= 
very pessimistic)  
How would you rank the level of security in 
your community? 
Measures of Parental Participation in Councils (Dependent Variables) 
Parent Council 
Membership 




1 2 point (1= no to 2= yes) Have you ever been a candidate for election to 
the parent council? 
Parent Council 
Elections 








1 2 point (1= no to 2= yes) Do you know who the current members of the 
parent council are? 
Parent Council 
Utilization 
1 2 point (1= no to 2= yes) Have you ever spoken to a member of the par-
ent council about the education of your child? 
School Council 
Attendance  
1 2 point (1= no to 2= yes) Have you ever attended a meeting of the school 
council? 
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Observations of Dependent Variables: Pa-
rental Participation  
In terms of dependent variables, Table 3 (page 9) re-
ports the frequencies and percentages of participant 
responses. Results are interesting in several respects. 
First, self-reports indicate that parent councils and 
school councils exist and are operating at all five 
schools. This is an impressive accomplishment given 
the challenges of mobilizing such a large number of 
people. The results are also impressive in that they 
indicate the majority of respondents have voted in an 
election for the parent council. Additionally, with the 
exception of La Dalia, the vast majority of respondents 
report having participated in a meeting of the parent 
council. The average respondent also appears to know 
a current member of the parent council. On these ac-




Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Income, Education, and Security by School 
Schools Income Education Security 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. 
Santa Ana 3.67 1.791 2.07 .869 1.89 .871 
El Tuma 3.61 1.270 1.88 .833 3.00 .978 
La Dalia 3.71 1.761 2.12 .909 2.62 1.299 
San Ramon 3.88 1.513 2.59 .832 3.10 1.221 
La Garita 4.41 1.478 2.95 .605 4.27 1.262 
 
 
However, participation is not a straightforward af-
fair and we should not assume that attendance at 
council meetings is evidence of meaningful participa-
tion in council deliberations. For example, although 
63 percent of survey respondents at La Garita reported 
having attended a parent council meeting, only 25 
percent of the same respondents reported having spo-
ken to a council member about their concerns. So, 
although parents may be attending parent council 
meetings, this does not necessarily mean that they use 
the council system to represent their concerns and ad-
vance their interests via deliberation with elected 
council representatives. Of course, alternative mecha-
nisms for advancing interests may exist, but the results 
presented in Table 3 suggest that stakeholders do not 
always use the system of representation the New Law 
established for this purpose. 
The Relationship between Socioeconomic 
Status and Parental Participation within 
Individual Schools 
To test the SES hypothesis, I first use a discriminant 
functions analysis to examine the relationship between 
variables within each school. The security variable is 
not likely to have a statistically significant relationship 
within any of the dependent variables because it is a 
community-level variable and should therefore exhibit 
little variation between respondents from the same 
school. In Santa Ana, the education variable is found 
to be the only measure to successfully classify partici-
pants from nonparticipants. First, education is only 
moderately successful in classifying those who have 
been a candidate in parent council elections from 
those who have not (F (1,72) = 5.501, p=.022). Edu-
cation is also moderately successful in classifying those 
who have attended a meeting of the general school 
council from those who have not (F (1,72) = 5.661, 
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p=.020), suggesting those with more education are 
more likely to belong to the participant group. No 
other SES measure successfully distinguishes partici-
pant groups from nonparticipant groups in this case.  
For El Tuma, La Dalia, and San Ramon, the SES 
measures do not distinguish participant groups from 
non-participant groups in any category with any de-
gree of statistical significance. For La Garita, one’s level 
of education is moderately successful in classifying 
those who have been members of the parent council 
from those who have not (F (1,39)= 6.770, p=.015). 
Additionally, measures for education moderately dis-
tinguish those who have attended a school council 
meeting from those who have not at La Garita (F 
(1,39)= 11.569, p=.002).  
 
Table 3: Response Frequency (Freq) and Percentages (%) for Parental Participation by School 
Schools 
Santa Ana El Tuma La Dalia San Ramon La Garita Variable Response 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Freq 18 55 4 22 7 20 7 30 8 32 
Membership 
% 25 75 15 86 25 72 19 81 20 80 
Freq 34 39 8 18 8 19 15 20 14 23 
Candidacy 
% 47 53 31 69 29 68 40 54 35 57 
Freq 56 17 20 6 21 6 23 11 33 7 
Elections 
% 77 23 77 23 75 22 62 30 83 17 
Freq 58 15 20 6 8 18 28 9 25 14 
Participation 
% 80 20 77 23 29 64 70 24 63 35 
Freq 66 7 20 6 15 10 23 11 19 19 
Knowledge 
% 90 10 77 23 54 36 62 30 50 50 
Freq 59 14 10 16 11 15 21 13 10 30 
Utilization 
% 81 19 39 62 39 54 57 35 25 75 
Freq 50 22 9 17 10 17 21 15 9 31 
Attendance 
% 69 30 35 65 36 61 57 41 22 78 
 
On the basis of these findings, there is limited evi-
dence of a relationship between SES characteristics 
and participation within schools. Education is the only 
variable to successfully classify participant from non-
participant groups, but the findings are limited to cer-
tain participatory practices (council membership and 
council meeting attendance) and to only two schools. 
Additionally, the strength of the relationship between 
education and participatory practices is moderate. 
Drawing on the evidence presented here, the SES hy-
pothesis is not supported.  
The Relationship between Socioeconomic 
Status and Parental Participation within 
the General Population 
A third test considers the relationship within the gen-
eral population. On this account, there is no control 
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for schools. Discriminant functions analysis finds that 
only the security variable lends strong and consistent 
support to the SES hypothesis. Specifically, the security 
variable is moderately successful in classifying those 
who have participated in a parent council meeting 
from those who have not (F (1,203) = 10.143, 
p=.002). Security is also moderately successful in clas-
sifying those who know the current member of their 
parent council from those who do not (F (1,203) = 
13.778, P< .001). The security measure is highly suc-
cessful in classifying those who have spoken to a 
council member about their child’s education from 
those who have not (F (1,203) = 30.155, P< .001). 
The security variable is also highly successful in classi-
fying those who have attended a meeting of the general 
school council from those who have not (school coun-
cil attendance) (F (1,203) = 7.997, p=.005). 
The finding that security relates to participation is 
interesting and requires further investigation. In com-
munities characterized by such extreme levels of 
crime, parents might not risk personal safety by travel-
ing unnecessarily during mid-to-late afternoons and 
early evenings to attend council meetings regularly. 
This cost-benefit calculation might explain the lower 
levels of parental participation at parent council meet-
ings at La Garita and, to some extent, San Ramon. An 
alternative explanation is implied by Hirschi’s (1969) 
theory of anti-social behaviour, which suggests high 
levels of crime are indicative of weak social bonds 
within the community. Putnam (1993; 1995) famously 
found social bonds to be strong predictors of political 
participation and, on this ‘social capital’ account, 
communities like La Garita could suffer a participation 
deficit because of weak social ties or social bonds. This 
account could explain the higher rate of crime in La 
Garita as well as the community’s participatory deficits 
in the council system. Finally, a third explanation 
might be that the security variable itself reflects some-
thing other than community security or crime rates. To 
illustrate, consider that La Garita is the poorest, least 
safe, and most remote school community in the sam-
ple. It is difficult to get to and many taxis refuse to en-
ter the area at night. Under such conditions, it is not 
hard to imagine that the principal at La Garita must 
find it difficult to recruit and retain qualified teachers. 
Thus, it is conceivable that the relationship may be 
due to a host of factors related to crime, such as low-
quality staff, rather than crime itself.  
The Relationship between School and Pa-
rental Participation within the General 
Population 
A fourth test is conducted using “the school” as a non-
specific, overarching variable that, in all likelihood, 
encompasses multiple factors. Although one cannot 
speak about this variable with any precision, examin-
ing a relationship between the school and indicators of 
parental participation in school councils may shed im-
portant light on the nature of education decentraliza-
tion in Matagalpa. In this test, the school variable is 
highly successful in distinguishing those who know 
their council representatives from those who don’t (F 
(1,203)= 21.648, P<.001). School is also a very helpful 
measure for distinguishing those who have spoken to 
council members about their concerns from those who 
have not (F (1,203)= 21.625, P<.001). Finally, school 
is also a successful measure for distinguishing those 
who have attended a meeting of the general school 
council from those who have not (F (1,203)= 12.041, 
p=.001).  
This finding clearly shows that participation is 
likely to vary between schools exposed to the same 
policy treatment. While we cannot be sure about the 
reasons for this finding, it is very significant for the 
decentralization debate because it implies that the 
practice of decentralization depends on something 
other than the legislated policy itself. In this study, we 
have suggested that parental education, crime rates, 
and social bonds may be part of this explanation, but 
much more work in this area is required. However, 
this finding is a clear warning against the universal 
application of decentralized programs in education.  
Conclusion and Policy Recommen-
dations 
Drawing on certain social assumptions about the 
paramount importance of individualism and the need 
to encourage choice, the main focus of education de-
centralization programs is the empowerment of indi-
vidual households rather than resource redistribution, 
income maintenance, or capacity-building measures 
(Penn, 2002). This study began by asking, “Does a 
parent’s socioeconomic background predict their par-
ticipation in their autonomous school council?” Re-
sults suggest a need to refocus attention and effort on 
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structural inequities that prevent parents from partici-
pating in ways predicted by decentralization architects.  
First, the study challenges conventional wisdom 
by showing that parental participation in decentraliza-
tion initiatives varies among communities exposed to 
the same policy treatment. On this account, this study 
should be read alongside previous work reaching simi-
lar conclusions (Wylie, 1999). Second, the study high-
lights a critical distinction between de jure autonomy 
(the passage of reform legislation) and de facto auton-
omy (the actual practice of school autonomy in 
schools) (Gunnarsson, 2004) and highlights the need 
to explain the difference. Third, observed differences 
in the participatory practices of stakeholders caution 
against using narrow definitions of participation, such 
as attendance at meeting, but rather point to a reality 
of participation in decentralized programs that is both 
complex and multi-faceted.   
Of course, a compelling aspect of these findings is 
that they beg an answer to the question of how to ex-
plain participatory differences between households 
and communities. On this account, partial support for 
an SES explanation is found. While there is little dis-
cernable evidence to suggest that household income 
and levels of education are directly responsible for ob-
servable differences, some evidence that community 
crime rates may, in part, predict participatory differ-
ences between school communities has been offered. 
The nature of the relationship between crime, vio-
lence, and participation is far from clear. Possible ex-
planations for these observations may include individ-
ual cost-benefit problems, the inability of these schools 
to attract and retain quality staff, and social capital de-
ficiencies. Nevertheless, the warnings are significant. 
By proceeding with education decentralization without 
considering the influence of SES characteristics, pro-
grams may produce a two-pronged effect. First, they 
can overburden school staff with new administrative 
responsibilities without commensurate support from 
the wider community. Second, if a participatory deficit 
exists, these programs can open the door for corrup-
tion and program capture because parents are not in-
volved in sufficient numbers to hold decision-makers 
accountable (Bahiigwa, Rigby, & Woodhouse, 2005; 
Francis & James, 2003; Bardhan, 2002).  
To conclude, this study has made the case that 
stakeholder participation in decentralized educational 
programs is contingent on factors beyond the legis-
lated policy itself. The first step towards improving 
decentralized education programs is to find out what 
these contingent factors are. To some extent, an SES 
model is useful in identifying these factors, but much 
more research in this area is required. However, if we 
are to make meaningful headway, policy planners and 
researchers alike must abandon individualistic models 
that deny the socio-structural characteristics that de-
fine households and school communities in the devel-
oping world. Only when these circumstances are un-
derstood as barriers to parental participation in decen-
tralized educational programs, will we have a sufficient 
model of participation and its determinants. Only 
when these circumstances are accounted will it be pos-
sible to meet the objective of distributing the benefits 
of decentralized programs in an equitable and democ-
ratic fashion.  
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